Description
Quorum finds EVM smart-contract bugs and publishes only the ones it can prove. For each candidate it writes a Foundry exploit, runs it on a mainnet fork at the block the bug was live, and keeps the finding only if the attacker's balance actually goes up.
It has reproduced four real 2026 hacks to the wei: Unistreet (+0.0072 WETH), Sandbox (+1,000,000 SAND), Squid (+712 USDC), and GaslessReservoir (+0.836 WETH, proven with the answer withheld from the model).
It also publishes its own miss rate: 64% recall across 143 known-bug contracts over 11 runs, and it leaves on the page the one row where Slither still beats it.
Each proof becomes a paid on-chain claim: the ClaimRegistry burns a 100,000 QUORUM fee and records the digest in one transaction, so a record cannot exist without paying for itself. It runs live on both Robinhood Chain (chain 4663) and Arbitrum One.
Progress During Hackathon
Quorum entered the buildathon (window opened 2026-09-13) as an early contract scanner and left it as an engine that proves a bug by running the exploit, then records each proof as a paid on-chain claim.
132 commits in the window, all public and dated. In order:
Sep 15: wrote the ClaimRegistry (one fee, one claim) with the Solidity contract, Foundry tests, and the Python client.
Sep 18: deployed the ClaimRegistry live on Robinhood Chain with its tests in CI; read the public Robinhood Chain contract repos by hand and flagged four real bugs in money-handling code.
Sep 19: verified the registry source on the explorer; ran the first measurement against modern audit contests, which surfaced three real defects.
Sep 22 to 24: made the benchmark score the tool that actually ships, and began publishing the method's own miss rate, including one reader pair whose recall is 0 percent.
Sep 27: added the prove stage, the change that defines the product. A hypothesis becomes a finding only when its generated exploit runs on a mainnet fork at the block the bug was live and the attacker's balance rises. Proved the first blind drains; Squid drained a real victim Safe for 712 USDC after locating that victim on-chain.
Sep 28: reproduced four 2026 hacks to the wei, one of them end-to-end blind with the answer withheld from the model; closed the false-proof holes (a generated exploit may not mint, call deal, or impersonate anyone but the attacker); re-led the README and site with the prove engine.
Oct 1: added Robinhood Chain (4663) to the fetch-and-prove path; wrote the company thesis for this entry.
Oct 2: deployed the same claim layer to Arbitrum One (QUORUM token, ClaimRegistry, and a first claim with the 100,000 QUORUM fee burned, source verified on both chains); ran Slither and Aderyn on the registry and documented every flag as a false positive with the reason; surfaced the two-chain claim layer on the site; rebuilt the demo video.
External signal in the window: Socket/Bungee, a cross-chain bridge, confirmed that a latent critical bug Quorum independently flagged in its RFQ vault contract deployed on Robinhood Chain is real, and that a fix is scheduled.
Fundraising Status
Nothing raised yet, an Arbitrum grant would pay for the compute the hunt-and-prove runs take, which is the real limit on how much we can scan right now.
